Mega-irrigation and neoliberalism in postcolonial states : Evolution and crisis in the Gharb Plain, Morocco by Minoia, Paola
MEGA­IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES
© The author 2012
Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography
269
MEGA­IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN 
POSTCOLONIAL STATES: 




MINOIA, P. (2012): ‘Mega­irrigation and neoliberalism in post-
colonial states: evolution and crisis in the Gharb Plain, Morocco’, 
Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 94 (3): 
269–286.
ABSTRACT. This article explores the development, evolution and 
impacts of large­scale irrigation schemes in the formation of the 
postcolonial state of Morocco and in more recent neoliberal dec-
ades. In particular, the article focuses on the Gharb Plain in the 
Sebou River basin, which was targeted by huge investments to be-
come the core region for national development. In this area, three 
stages of development – colonial, early independent, and the ag-
gressive politique des grandes barrages post­1970 – have creat-
ed two clearly different and successive landscapes. The traditional 
landscape has been overlain, and largely obliterated, by colonial 
and postcolonial governmental landscapes, reflected through dif-
ferent spatial, economic, cultural, and political patterns over time. 
In the present, a fourth stage of neoliberal development is occur-
ring in the landscape, in which diffused poverty and ecosystem col-
lapse coincide with greater concentrated wealth and the building of 
technological infrastructures. The article aims to complement criti-
cal studies on neoliberal environments, by focusing in particular on 
the manipulation, dispossession and commodification of water and 
land resources in irrigated agriculture in Morocco. These emerging 
rationalities are closely related to the changing policies of the con-
temporary Moroccan state.
Keywords: mega­irrigation schemes, Morocco, neoliberalism, 
postcolonial development, state territorialization
Introduction
The Gharb irrigation scheme is an example of mega­
projects, typical of many state development policies 
during the past century, and of postcolonial states in 
the past 50 years. Considered as economic engines, 
their territorial impacts have largely been disregard-
ed until recent times, when their contradictions have 
become more evident because of progressive state 
disengagement, connected to a critical economic 
environment.
 The Gharb’s history is not only significant for 
the exploration of the development, evolution and 
impacts of large­scale water schemes in the forma-
tion of the Moroccan state, as it allows exploring 
critical phenomena that are commonly experienced 
in many postcolonial states. More specifically, it 
aims to contribute to the geographical debate about 
the importance to build environmental histories to 
scrutinize power relations and impacts in historical-
ly situated socio­natural settings.
 The theoretical framework is situated in the 
political­ ecology perspectives that look at society 
and nature as deeply intertwined, and at engineer-
ing interventions in the landscape as political acts, 
aiming to produce new socio­natural landscapes 
that are coherent with the decision­makers’ strate-
gies (Swyngedouw 1999; Robbins 2004; Minoia 
2006; Heynen et al. 2007). The need to focus eco-
logically appropriate and socially just insights 
(Davis 2009) well integrates post­development ge-
ographies in deconstructing official, internation-
al narratives that would explain the current crisis, 
especially in the countries of the Global South 
(Escobar 1995). Studies in environmental histo-
ry allow positioning specific facts of water and na-
ture re­engineering in line with globally dominant 
governmentalities (McNeill 2000; also Swearingen 
1988, for a Moroccan case study). Critical research 
on neoliberalism and its effects is also considered, 
in terms of changes of political, social and economic 
nature that are induced by external pressures, espe-
cially in developing countries, by international fi-
nancial agencies (Harvey 2005; McCarthy 2007).
 This work also builds upon literature that has 
studied impacts of neoliberal water policies (e.g. 
Castro 2007; Goldman 2007) and further develops 
a critical analysis of the water demand management 
approaches that are currently so popular internation-
ally. Davis’ (2006) contribution is also relevant, for 
the way she relates neoliberalism and agricultural 
restructuring policies and deconstructs declention-
ist colonial environmental narratives in Morocco. 
However, also due to the different geographical 
focus of this article, which is on an irrigated plain 
(while Davis’ case is based in the rain­fed South), 
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territorialization and hydro­political theories have 
more centrality here.
 As for the case study, this article will initially fo-
cus on the territorial changes superimposed on the 
Gharb Plain, part of the Sebou catchment area, which 
were pushed by planners with the intent to create a 
core productive region that would power the national 
economy and enforce the political project of the new 
nation­state. Second, the article will observe the im-
pacts of the recent neoliberal developmentalism, in 
which the state has selectively reduced its directive 
role in the agricultural sector, while new trade agree-
ments and landownership structures have led to a re-
turning foreign presence. This governance shift has 
also produced relevant impacts, despite the minor en-
gineering intervention that occurred in this phase. In 
fact, the new rules have contributed to a further dis-
possession of natural resources from the local com-
munities and thus increased their vulnerability.
 These consequences have been observed 
through a close contact with the studied areas and 
their actors, to access different sources and to re-
cord local insight. Fieldwork has been very impor-
tant for this study. Visits completed between 2005 
and 2008 have allowed access to a large amount of 
literature that is locally available on issues related to 
politics and water­related fields either in Morocco or 
the Gharb and that includes, besides books and arti-
cles, unpublished theses, newspapers, governmen-
tal reports and statistics. Visits to the Gharb Plain 
have allowed observation, semi­structured and un-
structured conversations. A field trip and two sem-
inars were also organized with a class of Master 
students in geography of the University of Rabat in 
2007, as part of a course I gave as a visiting lecturer. 
These events allowed observation of the landscape 
and questions to be raised, particularly through in-
terviews with regional technical officers working in 
the water and agricultural sectors in the Gharb, con-
sultants involved in the water management reform, 
and local farmers, including women, whom we met 
in the fields and in small towns. While the experts 
provided local statistics that had not been published 
in national reports, the aim of the interviews with 
farmers and local residents was to gather qualitative 
insight into the ways certain political and manage-
ment changes have been enacted in that particular 
context, how they have been perceived, and what 
personal consequences they have led to in peoples’ 
lives (Secor 2010). A very important experience was 
also the discussion of the students’ findings in class, 
to interpret experiences and meanings.
Hydraulic territorialization in postcolonial 
states
The territorializing nature of water infrastructures 
has been explored for decades (e.g. Wittfogel 1957; 
Hunt and Hunt 1978; Waterbury 1979), explaining 
the ways in which mega­engineered projects have 
influenced the development processes of places 
through the control over their human and natural re-
sources. According to McNeill (2000, p. 150):
Churchill ... Lenin, Franklin Roosevelt, Nehru, 
Deng Xiaoping, and a host of lesser figures saw 
water in much the same way, and encouraged 
massive water projects in the USSR, the United 
States, India, and China. They did so because 
they all lived in an age in which states and socie-
ties regarded adjustments to nature’s hydrology 
as a route to greater power or prosperity.
Thus the inclusion of nature in the socio­political 
construction allows deepening of the concept of ter-
ritory over which powers exercise their own strate-
gies (Delaney 2005). By establishing infrastructures 
and setting up new rules, hydraulic territorialization 
reflects and incorporates features of the social order 
that creates them. In postcolonial contexts, and par-
ticularly in the first decades of independence, this 
order has tended to be coherent with, and support-
ing of, the production of strong nation­state terri-
torial discourses. The construction of regimes has 
followed the ideal model of the Keynesian wel-
fare national state, characterized by an ‘autocentric 
circle of mass production’, although not consider-
ing the need to secure mass consumption, but ‘se-
cured through a distinctive mode of regulation that 
was discursively, institutionally and practically ma-
terialised’ (Jessop 2002, p. 55). New infrastruc-
tural works that are functional of new production 
schemes and activities have been conceived by 
state powers as material signs for territorial control, 
while their symbolic power entails a significant so-
cial transformation and is often constitutive of new 
national identities (Turco 1988). Similar models 
have been performed in non­developing countries; 
particularly, the experience of Spain under Franco 
reported by Swyngedouw (2007) illustrates the 
linkages between nationalism and techno­ natural 
material infrastructures in articulating a new geo-
graphical project. However, the peculiarity of the 
postcolonial countries resides in their limited sov-
ereignty, which continues after the financial crisis 
started in the 1980s and in the internal governance 
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relations (Sidaway 2007), as explored later in this 
article.
 Particularly during the first decades, the new in-
dependent states made the largest efforts in their plans 
of economic modernization, in which mega water­ 
engineering projects played a great role (Showers 
2011). While the first infrastructures were mainly to 
provide water for agriculture, to control floods and to 
transform allegedly unproductive areas into highly 
productive lands, later dams became multipurpose, 
also meant to produce hydroelectric energy (McNeill 
2000). However, despite propaganda and rhetorical 
claims referring to the shared benefits of these struc-
tures for all, these infrastructures have been more at-
tractive for potential investors rather than for local 
communities. The reason is that by aiming at oblit-
erating previous livelihoods and territorialities, 
considered as pre­ modern, such projects have com-
monly dispossessed local communities of their tra-
ditional rights over the natural resources, and thus 
created new marginalized, exploited and poverty 
stricken groups (World Commission on Dams 2000). 
Critical literature has in fact described the undemo-
cratic nature, dubious economic benefits, and disas-
trous environmental consequences of mega­projects 
(e.g. Shiva 2002; Flyvberg et al. 2003). Examples of 
these processes have been observed in different are-
as of the world, such as in southern Egypt (McNeill 
2000), in the Sudanese New Halfa scheme (Bertoncin 
et al. 1995) and Merowe dam (Hashim 2010), in the 
Tunisian Lake Ichkeul (Smart 2003), in the Turkish 
Great Anatolian Project (Ward 1997), in the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project (Transformation Resource 
Centre 2000) and in the Chinese Three Gorges pro-
ject (Duan and Steil 2003).
 Postcolonial governments have not been the 
sole or even the strongest players in their own ter-
ritories. The international influence over investment 
decisions in irrigation schemes of different coun-
tries has been remarkable during the whole twenti-
eth century through a number of ways: first, through 
direct investments by enterprises of colonial origin, 
particularly in the early years of the decolonization 
processes (e.g. Waterbury 1979; Swearingen 1988); 
second, by an intensification of international mar-
ket relations, by increased production of crops for 
exportation (e.g. Bicciato and Faggi 1995; Akesbi 
2006); lastly, by intensified international aid and fi-
nancial loans, mainly channelled by the World Bank, 
and subjected to strict conditionalities in the field of 
macro­economic and institutional reforms (Harvey 
2003, p. 181).
 With reference to the water sector, many gov-
ernment institutions started disengaging from the 
engineering maintenance tasks, as part of wider pro-
cesses of decentralization and privatization that per-
meated policies throughout the world, particularly 
from the 1980s. A situation of clear state domination 
over the main infrastructures and working proce-
dures was then replaced by a situation of govern-
ance uncertainty.
Neoliberal developmentalism in irrigation
Neoliberal pressures have been moved to postco-
lonial countries throughout the globe. However, 
their application has been internalized in different 
ways and encountered various obstacles, particular-
ly in states where authoritarian powers are still the 
main regulators. Despite clear modernization of the 
new public administrations, some typical features of 
Western neoliberal states are lacking, like the ‘le-
gal framework allowing freedom of businesses and 
corporations’ (Harvey 2005, p. 64). For instance, 
Morocco’s political system (makhzen) is based on 
neopatrimonialism, ensuring the power base to its 
leaders (Bicchi et al. 2004; Cammack 2007), and 
on manipulated propaganda. The deployment of ne-
oliberal policies, supported by foreign aid, has in-
tersected both the protection of corporate interests 
as well as the long declared land reform. Moreover, 
some critical aspects related to the agricultural sec-
tor make water privatization difficult to achieve in 
Africa, not least because of the low economic attrac-
tiveness of irrigation networks for private investors 
(McNeill 2000), particularly in the MENA region 
(Ahmad 2000). The scarce response of private sec-
tor companies to replace public water providers has 
produced fundamental gaps in the management sys-
tem of irrigation schemes. Who should then take 
over the management of large­scale infrastructures 
and of the irrigation services?
 Declentionist environmental narratives have 
blamed both farmers and public institutions for hav-
ing depleted water resources and thus for their in-
capacity to manage them (Davis 2006). In line with 
these ideas, to solve irrigation mismanagement and 
the problems of water scarcity it has caused, wheth-
er the responsibility of public offices or farmers, a 
new approach came into existence, that of water de-
mand management. In contrast to the water supply 
approach, typical of the previous decades in postco-
lonial countries and expensively applied by strong 
state apparatuses to construct dams and canalization 
PAOLA MINOIA
© The author 2012
Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography
272
networks, the water demand management approach 
proposes soft interventions. The concept includes 
environmental and Malthusian concerns with re-
spect to the exhausted resources. Solutions are 
sought through new water­saving regulations, con-
sidered as having lower impact than infrastructures 
and able to rationalize uses of available resources 
(FAO 2002).
 However, water demand management is not 
a neutral response to the problems caused by bad 
irrigation practices, but embeds clear neoliberal 
principles in natural resource management. Three 
principles are particularly strengthened in the new 
policy reforms that are applied worldwide: tech-
nical modernization, state disengagement and 
pricing.
 First of all, water demand management re-
quires modernization of the irrigation networks es-
pecially to avoid water losses. The wide presence 
of open gravitational canal networks that were typ-
ically installed during the past decades is consid-
ered the main barrier to solve leakage, evaporation, 
excessive withdrawals and water stealing (Varela­
Ortega and Sagardoy 2003). Technical knowledge 
is more appreciated then traditional knowledge, 
considered as obsolete, particularly if crops are 
meant to compete internationally. Attempts to re-
cover traditional water tools and networks, like the 
foggara or khattara in Northern Africa, mainly be-
long to cultural projects funded by international 
donors on a small scale (Laureano 2001). Besides 
know­how, purchase of new tools and use of ener-
gy increase production costs that small farmers can 
hardly afford.
 The second neoliberal principle, state disen-
gagement, is connected with the rhetoric of de-
mocratization of economic and political systems. 
Public–private partnerships are meant to contrast 
the presence of strong state control over water and 
land resources. Contrarily to the principle of water 
supply management that was requiring state inter-
ventionism, the principle of demand management 
means to empower water users, and to respond to 
their real irrigation requirements. If sales of irriga-
tion schemes are not feasible for lack of interest by 
external corporations, as earlier mentioned, the exit 
strategy for the state is to hand over the schemes to 
the same farmers, despite the spread idea of their 
inability to run the networks efficiently. These de-
cisions are supported by international aid pro-
grammes, based on the theoretical principle that 
farmers are the best actors to manage carefully their 
scarce resources (UNDP 2006). However, prob-
lems arise when the real stakes are not direct sourc-
es, but rather complex infrastructures and schemes 
that have been established and governed by central-
ized, authoritarian powers for so many years. The 
situation is worsened by the fact that the handing 
over has not been preceded by amelioration works 
in the schemes (e.g. restoration of canals, clean up 
from silt and weeds, or introduction of water me-
ters to record the consumed volumes) or by a full 
reorganization of the irrigation cycles to allow in-
dependent crops. The reality is that obsolete giant 
networks are simply proposed to farmers’ groups 
that have their lands and their living there (i.e. in 
Sudan, on which see Omer 2008). Finally, the en-
trance in new international trade agreements in 
an overall situation of market uncertainty has in-
creased insecurity among the producers, since they 
cannot benefit from public subsidies, considered 
to disrupt the market competition. Consequently, 
the devolution of irrigation management to farm-
ers has not empowered the majority of them; on the 
contrary, it has created dramatic consequences for 
many small producers. Wealthy landowners have 
increased their accumulation of land sold by the im-
poverished categories and have means to access al-
ternative sources of water, if the canals are silted or 
infested by weeds, for instance groundwater sourc-
es through engine­ powered pumps (e.g. Bertoncin 
et al. 1995; Minoia and Guglielmi 2008).
 The third key element of these soft tools is the 
market pricing, which, according to an economic 
approach, would regulate the consumption of water 
(Ahmad 2000), promote conservative uses of scarce 
resources and alleviate losses (Oubalkace 2007). 
Despite various contradictions related to the appli-
cation of prices to a non­marketable good (Petrella 
2001; Swyngedouw 2005), pricing mechanisms 
have been applied in most developing countries. 
The shift in water management, from subsidized re-
sources towards regimes of full­cost pricing, has a 
questionable economic rationale, since the intro-
duction of new technologies increases water tar-
iffs, thereby making water even less accessible to 
poor users. On this subject, and mainly on the re-
lated question of access to drinking water as a com-
mon good, there is already abundant research (e.g. 
Laurie 2007), while the issue of pricing of water 
in the irrigation sector is less addressed by geogra-
phers in development studies. Because of its rele-
vance, I will consider this issue in the case study of 
Gharb.
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Rationale of the Gharb case study
The conceptual framework exposed in the first 
sections will structure a narrative of the political­ 
ecological history of the Gharb case. Political, social 
and natural aspects are intertwined in the production 
process of the nation and its physical environment, 
in accordance with the governmental model and the 
modernization culture. Through the exploration of 
the Gharb, I aim to present a territory that has been 
heavily remodelled by the postcolonial and neolib-
eral utopias of growth. Following a historical anal-
ysis of the main territorializing facts in this region, I 
will demonstrate that despite huge engineering and 
technological interventions, many farmers are now 
unable to access natural resources of sufficient qual-
ity to secure their livelihoods, and to rebuild their 
own territoriality.
 The presentation will be developed in two sec-
tions. The first, based particularly on Swearingen’s 
historical account (1988), will present the evolution 
of the region from the colonial times to the realiza-
tion of the great Projet Sebou and some produced 
impacts. The second section will then focus on the 
current neoliberal phase, which is causing nega-
tive pressures on the environment and the local 
communities.
Water control and territorial changes in the 
Gharb Plain
The Gharb Plain is located in the lower portion of 
the Sebou catchment and flows across the Atlantic 
coastal plain (Fig. 1). In terms of water volume, it 
is the richest river in the country. Water control has 
long been the main focus of the territorial organiza-
tion of the Gharb Plain and, as a result, it has deeply 
modified both ecosystems and human territoriali-
ties. In many ways, the history of the Gharb can be 
seen as a process involving different social and in-
stitutional actors, with the water­soil system as the 
main resource for their reproduction, empowerment 
and building their development assets.
 Before the French Protectorate, established 
in 1912, the water and soil potentials of the Gharb 
Plain attracted nomadic communities of main-
ly Arabic groups as far back as the twelfth centu-
ry and mixed to indigenous Amazigh tribes. Le Coz 
(1964) presents an in­depth description of the local 
communities and their territorialities before heavy 
state planning from the 1970s destroyed their spa-
tial organization. Their livelihoods were based on 
crop and grazing depending on a flexible relation 
with the land, on the variability of floods, and thus, 
on soil humidity and composition. Their villages 
(douar) were established on elevated zones near the 
Sebou and the Beht rivers, protected from the flood 
Figure 1. Sebou Basin and Gharb Plain.
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risks. Permanent marshes (merja) could not be uti-
lized, but in spring and summer their edges were 
sufficiently dry to be used for livestock grazing. 
Muddy­sandy alluviums and hydromorphic soils 
were exploited by biennial rotations, which alter-
nated cereals with pastural fallow lands. The main 
crops were grown in winter, with sorghum and mil-
let cultivated in the spring and summer.
 Strong patterns of territorial control only start-
ed in the twentieth century, opening an era of great 
physical and social changes, performed through new 
political systems. In the next paragraphs I will fo-
cus on the most significant historical discontinuities 
that occurred in the territorial management: the co-
lonial reclamation, the postcolonial institutional set-
ting and the Projet Sebou. I will analyse the current 
state of implementation of the management plans 
and their impacts, and will then focus on the pres-
sures induced by the current neoliberal state disen-
gagement policy.
Colonial reclamation
Soon after the establishment of the French 
Protectorate, the Gharb region was considered for 
its agricultural potential. However, to expand its 
production, to the extent of re­constituting the old 
‘Granary of Rome’ (Swearingen 1988), it was con-
sidered necessary to overcome some physical ob-
stacles: marshes and seasonal floods. In 1917, the 
Séjournet Plan, named after the French engineer 
who proposed it, designed the first hydraulic works: 
drainage of the central merjas, soil removal and the 
digging of canals connecting the wetlands to the 
Sebou and Beht rivers. No consideration was paid to 
the contemporary use of lands of the local tribes. A 
great flood in 1927 justified a re­launch of the plan 
and the construction of El Kansera dam (1935), the 
first one to be installed in the Sebou Basin.
 These technical interventions were truly territo-
rializing factors. The new infrastructures introduced 
spatial manoeuvre of water floods, obliterated the 
bases of the traditional livelihoods and were accom-
panied by a social reorganization, responding to the 
new spatial design that had given the Plain new pro-
ductive functions. The first beneficiaries of the new 
land availability were the new settlers, who also in-
troduced pumping from the rivers and considerably 
modified the agricultural techniques. Patterns of ag-
ricultural exploitation, as described by Swearingen 
(1988), served the European market’s demand. The 
continuous reclamation of the merjas reduced the 
pasture lands. This caused a progressive decline of 
the traditional rural livelihood, which induced an in-
ternal migration towards urban centres. Between 
1910 and 1960, the Gharb’s urban population in-
creased from 130,000 to 540,000 inhabitants, partic-
ularly concentrated in the triangle of Kénitra–Souk El 
Arbaa–Sidi Kacem, with a consequent alteration of 
their tribal organization (Royaume du Maroc 1970).
Postcolonial institutional setting
The first decade after independence (1956) was 
characterized by institutional reforms to affirm 
the new state’s administrative competence and so-
cial legitimacy in the country. New public bod-
ies were established with clear responsibilities in 
the fields of water and agricultural management. 
After years of trials, in the 1960s an office for ag-
ricultural valorization was created, and then divid-
ed into regional offices (ORMVA, Offices régionaux 
de mise en valeur agricole, or Regional Offices of 
Agricultural Enhancement). In the Gharb, the re-
gional office named ORMVA du Gharb (ORMVAG) 
acted as the lead institution, handling the equip-
ment, management needs and scheme valorization. 
The Agricultural Investment Code (1969) guided 
the sector modernization process (Belghiti 2005; 
Akesbi 2006).
 The new state also needed to build social trust 
among the people. With social expectations in fa-
vour of a state redistributive role, one of the key de-
clared policies was the nationalization of lands that 
were confiscated to colonial settlers, to be followed 
by an agrarian reform to return dispossessed lands 
to local populations. The reform, however, has not 
been more than a rhetorical discourse, since the land 
distribution favoured other interests, mainly the di-
rect state control of the productive resources, and 
then the agrarian bourgeoisie. State companies were 
created in the early 1970s in order to handle the 
fields recovered by land reform: mainly large prop-
erties of over 100 ha (El Gueddari 1998). The re-
maining land was granted to the rural bourgeoisie, 
rather than to the rural poor indigenous, to build a 
closer political alliance with the first group (Levau 
1976; Swearingen 1988).
Projet Sebou
Centralized state control and large infrastructural 
development were partly influenced by foreign in-
stitutions. In the mid­1960s, following the World 
MEGA­IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES
© The author 2012
Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography
275
Bank recommendations to solve the national finan-
cial problems, an economic strategy was developed 
with the aim to strengthen the primary sector and 
particularly exports. Water was considered a strate-
gic but uncertain resource, thus large­scale hydrau-
lic planning started to become central. Based on a 
preliminary study supported by UNDP and FAO, 
the huge Projet Sebou was launched in 1970 with 
the aim of transforming the river basin area into a 
strong economic region (Royaume du Maroc 1970; 
Swearingen 1988).
 This project was in line with the water sup-
ply management approach, considering water as a 
transferable input to be stocked and then moved into 
deficit areas. Massive public investment was co-
ordinated by the central government and support-
ed by foreign sponsors, mainly through the World 
Bank (World Commission on Dams 2000). So far, 
installed infrastructures include ten large dams, 
forty­ four small dams, a channel for water transfers, 
thousands of pumping stations and wells, and wide 
networks of irrigation and drainage canals. Other in-
terventions are planned for the coming years (ABH 
Sebou 2006).
 Implementation of the entire plan was supposed 
to be reached in 24 years, but it soon became clear 
that the target was overambitious. However, the fa-
vourable conditions of the Gharb plains made this 
area the first one to host the new infrastructures. In 
this region, the agricultural intensification of cash 
crops (e.g. rice, oilseeds and horticulture), and the 
introduction of new crops (like sugar cane), were 
sustained by the agro­industries (Boulassel et al. 
2001), while ORMVAG invested in experimen-
tal laboratories to introduce new species (e.g. the 
Centre Technique des Cultures Sucrières in Kénitra) 
and in further infrastructural investments such as 
roads, water supply and electricity, primary educa-
tion and dispensaries (Belghiti 2005). ORMVAG 
intervention has also included seed distribution, 
marketing, transportation services, settlements and 
rural street networks. As it was said by Mohamed 
El Hammouni, Chief of the exploitation service of 
the irrigation network (ORMVAG) interviewed in 
November 2007, ‘There is nothing but the Office in 
the Gharb … but unfortunately now there is an eco-
nomic crisis. Since 1990 ORMVAG cannot inter-
vene anymore’.
 The Gharb, however, cannot be reduced to a pro-
ductive space, as it is a complex region needing a 
more articulated governance system than a special-
ized institution like the ORMVAG could handle. 
Wide pressures have been generated in local terri-
tories, their communities and the environment, but 
nowadays there is a gap of responsibility to address 
them. The following section will describe some of 
the impacts suffered by the Gharb region as a conse-
quence of the la politique des digues of the 1970s–
1980s and the following period of financial crisis.
Impacts of the mega hydraulics
In the Middle Atlas, where the dams are physical-
ly located, local spaces have been devastated, with 
no compensation for their inhabitants, who had to 
leave their villages (Aderghal and Agoumi 2000). 
But even in the Gharb Plain, Projet Sebou has pro-
duced some unforeseen impacts.
 Population increase has induced extended land 
occupation that has endangered the original land-
scape, ecology and livelihoods in the transient mar-
gins of the marshlands (merja). In Western Gharb, 
communities living in tribal villages (douar) still 
practice rain­fed agriculture and complementary 
livestock along the merja borders. However, their 
livelihoods are challenged on two fronts. On the one 
hand, the new environmental regulations limit the 
right of pastoral activities, like in the Merja Zerga, 
recognized as a Ramsar site since 1980. On the other 
hand, in the western fringe of the merja and limited 
by coastal dunes, land is not accessible as it has been 
enclosed in intensive farming companies, outside 
the ORMVAG scheme. The presence of groundwa-
ter near the surface has in fact attracted new inter-
national investors who have installed greenhouse 
productions of high market value (watermelons, 
pineapples, avocados, peanuts, bananas, strawber-
ries, and flowers); but the excessive pumping is al-
ready creating concerns for the increased salinity of 
water (ABH Sebou 2006). On the other side of the 
Gharb, on the eastern Gharb­Chrarda hills, not cov-
ered by the engineered networks, local communities 
are restricted in small holdings that are less and less 
able to grow cereals for self­consumption. Fertility 
collapse and soil erosion cannot be addressed by 
shifting cultivations to other areas, since what was 
traditionally considered collective land has been en-
closed and sold; thus deprived farmers are forced to 
migrate (Berriane and Aderghal 2008).
 Even in the Central Gharb the irrigation scheme 
is facing various obstacles. While the networks were 
expected to rationalize water uses and intensify pro-
ductivity, the poor consensus gathered among local 
farmers has actually undermined the functioning of 
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the irrigation rules. Farmers interviewed in this area 
in May 2006 and November 2007 argued that the 
state did not actively involve or empower the people 
working in the scheme, and that they felt abandoned 
in the most critical phases.
 Vulnerable groups integrated as manpower into 
the scheme can hardly make a living. Responding to 
market­driven agricultural goals rather than to the 
needs of the original tribal groups, and disregard-
ing the previous territorialities that were based in the 
Gharb Plains, the project appears to have caused not 
only a physical change, but also social desegrega-
tion and economic problems.
Socio-economic disequilibria
The arguments in this section and the qualitative 
analysis reflect conversations and debates that I 
have had with local officers, consultants, farmers, 
students and researchers. Quantitative data have 
been acquired through official statistics, research re-
ports and newspapers articles.
 Official statistics report the situation of the Gharb 
region as presenting a poverty rate of 20.5 per cent 
against 14 per cent at the national level (Royaume 
du Maroc 2008). These data are surprising consid-
ering the massive investment that has been made in 
the Gharb for so many decades. However, it can be 
fully explained by the selective effort that has been 
made in this region: investment has been exclusive-
ly devoted to dominant groups, to strengthen their 
cash productions, at the expense of local communi-
ties and their food security.
 Land tenure has been a discriminating factor for 
the socio­economic wealth in agriculture. In post-
colonial Morocco, the priority assigned to the de-
velopment of extensive irrigated and mechanized 
farming was incompatible with the expected land re-
form. Land reform, despite the promises, has failed 
to redistribute land to local farmers. Two spectacu-
lar operations of recuperation of colonial domains, 
mainly exploited for arboriculture (vineyards, cit-
rus and olives) and horticulture, were established 
in 1963 over 316,380 ha and in 1973 over 446,005 
ha (Ghannam 2005; El Farah 2007). However they 
were handed over, respectively, to large landown-
ers and to new state companies: the Society of 
Agricultural Development (Société de développe-
ment agricole, SODEA), the Society of Agricultural 
Land Management (Société de gestion des terres 
agricoles, SOGETA) and the National Society 
for Livestock Development (Société nationale de 
développement de l’élevage, SNDE). According to 
official data, these companies received 135,000 ha, 
and the remaining land was distributed over a decade 
to 21,000 tenants organized in 671 cooperatives and 
11 unions (MADRPM 2006). Other sources, howev-
er, claim that even these lands included large areas 
granted to the establishment elite, including the roy-
al family, while landless farmers were substantially 
neglected (Swearingen 1988; Najjar 2006).
 As a matter of fact, the government engaged a 
policy that increased social disparity, allowing land 
accumulation at the hands of a minority of landown-
ers (Swearingen 1988). Big owners have been tar-
geted by special benefits, such as authorization for 
private pumping from the rivers and groundwater, 
discounted taxation, easy access to credit and mar-
keting facilities (Boulassel et al. 2001). As for the 
small units, the national laws have set limitations 
for the minimum sizes of holdings: 5 ha in irrigat-
ed lands, according to the Agricultural Investment 
Code (BO 1969), and 10 ha in rain­fed lands, ac-
cording to the law for the rain­fed land (bour) rec-
lamation schemes (BO 1995a), and forbid the 
traditional inheritance subdivision system below 
these minimum sizes. However, families remain 
compliant with the customary rules and so the sit-
uation remains one of extreme parcelling, although 
many of these small properties are registered as 
combined with other ownerships, thus creating the 
so­called indivisible properties, meaning that the 
different co­owners cannot either rent or sell their 
parcel independently. More than a decade ago, 
Bensouda Korachi (1998) calculated that 62 per cent 
of the overall cultivated land of the region was reg-
istered in this category, and that the average hold-
ing of small farmers was only 1.09 ha. No official 
statistics are available to monitor this hidden situ-
ation, but some independent studies have reported 
the evolution of this increasing land fragmentation 
for some areas. A recent survey in three douars lo-
cated on the right bank of the Sebou River (Rgrega, 
Ouled Moussa and Oled Mansour) reports that on 
the lands obtained by the reform and managed col-
lectively, each farmer has been assigned between 
1.2 and 3 ha, well under the thresholds indicated by 
law (Poncet et al. 2008). Another survey is based in 
the rural areas of Mnasra and Ben Mansour, Kénitra 
province (Hilali 2004). This is now the most dynam-
ic area or region, although land is not connected to 
the irrigation networks of the Sebou project; howev-
er productive labour does not make farmers wealthi-
er. More than 60 per cent of the households are based 
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on small holdings of 0.1 up to 4 ha; around 20 per 
cent are landless; while the remaining land is ex-
ploited in medium and large farms. Agriculture has 
been intensified by new private investments using 
groundwater pumped from the aquifer and introduc-
ing drip irrigation methods during the period 1984–
1992, mainly due to outsider entrepreneurs from 
Rabat, Casablanca and, more recently, from Spain.
 The new Moroccan landholders are mainly pub-
lic officers or businessmen with no previous in-
volvement in farming. In fact, they are absentees, 
and have expanded valuable cultivations through 
rental of land from the group of small landhold-
ers, particularly those having micro­holdings. The 
latter cannot ensure their own subsistence only 
through their land, and for this reason a common 
practice is to rent it out to the new class of agricul-
tural entrepreneurs and to offer their workforce to 
them in exchange for salaries. A consultant report 
for the government (Chiche 2007) presents the av-
erage amounts gained by the small holders for both 
the rented land (around MAD 3000 ha/year, corre-
sponding to EUR 266 or USD 372 in 2007) and the 
farming work (from MAD 3000 to 7500 per year 
and capita). The low rental fees are due to the low 
value of land unless it is equipped with private wells 
and pumps with electric engines, which only large 
entrepreneurs can afford to have. Salaried employ-
ment, though precarious, is considered to offer more 
security than direct farming for small landholders, 
and is surely the only possible income for landless 
families, who are mainly young and do not possess 
any cattle, if they do not have direct access to any 
borehole. Farmers in this group are paid less than 
MAD 3 per day and live in very poor shelters with 
no access to safe water.
 The area around Kénitra is more dynamic. The 
capitalistic farming system of this province attracts 
labour from a wide area. According to Poncet et al. 
(2008), many among the most skilled workers of the 
Central Gharb have left their fields to be employed 
in the new companies of Kénitra. For those who can 
keep their own farming in small holdings, the main 
crop is fodder to feed the cattle (one to two head) to 
provide some earning through milk production, sale 
of calves and capital security. However, small hold-
ers remain particularly vulnerable and exposed to 
poverty.
 Salaried work in farming also attracts children 
from the age of 11–12 years, leaving the school 
to contribute to their families’ subsistence. This is 
the main reason why, in the rural Gharb, only very 
reduced groups of students, after the primary lev-
el, access secondary and professional schools, with 
the result that 47.8 per cent of the population over 
10 years are illiterate (Royaume du Maroc 2008). 
Children’s contribution to the family income is also 
considered to be one of the reasons for the relatively 
high fertility rate: 2.7 children per woman compared 
with the national average of 2.5 children.
 Local food security has been neglected as far 
as production choices are concerned. According to 
Moussaoui et al. (2003), in spite of the Gharb’s eco-
nomic contribution to the national GDP, 28 and 15 
per cent of the population respectively do not meet 
their minimum requirements in calories and pro-
teins, and 6.6 per cent of children suffer from acute 
malnutrition. This situation is particularly dramatic 
in remote villages. Female­headed households with 
children and older family members are a common 
reality in many douars, and rely on revenues of men 
and young boys working on the large farms, in the 
main towns or abroad. Neither farming nor livestock 
raising are their source of living, particularly since 
the neoliberal changes from the 1990s.
 If the first migratory trend was mainly from 
the overpopulated and poor highlands of the High 
Gharb and Chrarda to the equipped Central Gharb, a 
second phase, started in the 1980s, is characterized 
by flows from the Central Gharb to reach the urban 
and industrial centres of Larache, Tanger, Kénitra, 
Tétouan and Casablanca. From the 1990s on, this 
flow has been integrated by a mobility of farmers 
towards the rich farms of the western Gharb. New 
households have been established around industrial 
and farming poles and near the cities. In the Gharb–
Chrarda–Bni Hssen region, urban growth is calcu-
lated at a rate of 2.3 per cent a year compared with 
0.7 per cent of demographic growth in the rural are-
as, and particularly due to the rural–urban migration 
flow, largely towards the regional centre of Kénitra 
(Royaume du Maroc 2008). However, this mobil-
ity has not ensured better social conditions of the 
migrants, since they have often settled in informal 
slums that are deprived of basic services, such as 
water, electricity, sanitation and so forth. The situ-
ation has become worse because of the recent eco-
nomic crisis that has resulted in closure of industrial 
plants. According to the same official source, 12,490 
people were employed in the region in 1999, which 
has decreased to 8727 in 2003; between 2002 and 
2004, agro­industrial production has declined by 27 
per cent.
 Therefore, a new social re­composition has been 
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produced in the region, with growing cities and in-
dustrial areas attracting labour flows, but destroying 
the traditional social structure and increasing pov-
erty. In more recent years, migration from the ru-
ral areas to foreign destinations, particularly to and 
through Spain, has become more common. While 
the national trend is reported by the Annuaire statis-
tique du Maroc (Haut Commissariat au Plan 2008), 
with an index of –3.2 in 2005–2006 and –3.0 in 
2006–2007, official data do not report the migra-
tion rate from the rural Gharb. However, visits to the 
fields and interviews with local people, public offic-
ers and researchers suggested that emigration is a 
very common strategy among the Gharb population.
 In November 2007 we interviewed a group of 
women in Souk el Arbaa. They had husbands and 
other family members in Europe, especially in 
Spain. We discussed the use of their remittances in 
terms of investment for the future. In most cases, 
they did not consider farming in the Gharb Plain to 
be a viable economic activity for their families, al-
though it had been important in the past. For them, 
farming presented too many risks of failure com-
pared with the opportunities offered by other sec-
tors, and therefore, they did not use remittances to 
buy new land, water pumps or farming machines. 
Rather, their goal was to improve their family’s life 
in the urban centres, building a new house, buying 
a car and establishing new commercial activities 
downtown, while others were waiting for a visa to 
join their family members, since they could not see a 
future for their children and themselves in that area. 
There was indeed a common perception that people 
were vacating the village. They acknowledged that 
the family reunions abroad would definitely break 
the douar linkages and cultures, but they did not see 
them as a priority.
Environmental impacts
The construction of dams in the Sebou Basin has 
produced environmental changes in the region that 
were mostly unexpected, since the instalments were 
not preceded by any adequate impact assessments 
and protection measures (World Commission on 
Dams 2000). In fact, the ecosystem values were 
completely neglected. Some of the main environ-
mental problems include loss of wetlands, alteration 
of water and soil quality, degradation of the river 
banks and coastal erosion (Laalou 1985). These im-
pacts are similar to those suffered in other coastal 
areas of the Mediterranean region, where wetlands, 
natural lakes and watersheds that are considered 
of international importance (i.e. Lake Ichkeul in 
Tunisia and the Great Sebkha of Oran in Algeria, 
listed as Ramsar areas) are degraded by water diver-
sion and artificial storage systems.
 The ecology of the Gharb coastal plains, located 
downstream and targeted by wide agricultural and 
industrial development requiring water withdraw-
als and pollutant discharges, has been heavily modi-
fied. The drainage of the merjas has caused a loss of 
important habitats, hence an impoverishment of bi-
odiversity and ecosystem functions. Waterbird spe-
cies have been affected by the disappearance of the 
Merja Dawra and nearby wetlands that constituted 
a shelter for large populations. A comparative study 
by Green et al. (2002) on the conservation status of 
Moroccan wetlands and birds’ habitats, with respect 
to the situation assessed in 1978 by Morgan (1982), 
shows a dramatic decrease in recorded species. The 
reasons are diverse: drainage, water extraction, fish-
ing, hunting and egg collecting, overgrazing and 
reed cutting, pollution, siltation, urban and road de-
velopment, and tourism.
 Some merjas have received noteworthy atten-
tion by conservation movements and are now pro-
tected by national and international regulations. The 
Zerga and Sidi Bou Ghaba wetlands have been rec-
ognized as Ramsar sites and biological reserves. 
Nevertheless, they are still threatened by continuous 
agricultural intensification that lowers the freshwa-
ter levels entering the merjas, by industrial and ur-
ban expansion, and lastly, by the tourists of the new 
resorts built along the nearby sandy beaches.
 The growth of informal settlements without 
proper sanitation facilities is also causing pollution 
in both the surface water and the water table (Nassali 
et al. 2005). The Sebou, particularly in the Gharb 
area, is the most heavily polluted river in Morocco 
(El Gueddari 1998). The main cause is the exten-
sive use of fertilizers and pesticides in agricultural 
activities on the Plain, and the pollution of activi-
ties upstream. Chemical and organic pollution cause 
eutrophication of the rivers and of the dams’ res-
ervoirs, particularly El Kansera Dam, biodiversity 
loss and contamination of the groundwater used by 
the population for drinking purposes (Debbarh and 
Badraoui 2002).
 The impact of agricultural runoff also affects soil 
quality. The primary outcomes are salinization and 
waterlogging, mainly due to excessive irrigation and 
insufficient drainage (Boulassel et al. 2006). Finally, 
the pumping of groundwater for coastal greenhouse 
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cultivations causes pressures on the aquifer, deter-
mines seawater intrusion, and thus, salinization of 
the resource.
Reflections of neoliberalism in the Gharb 
scheme
The analysis has so far supported the reconstruction 
of the Gharb history and the political strategies be-
hind it. It has also unveiled the aggressive approach 
of the new Moroccan state, involving environmen-
tal, agricultural and social engineering experiments, 
and its consequences, in terms of a weakening of the 
local people to react to overall environmental deg-
radation, political insecurity and economic reces-
sion. This section presents the current debate around 
the main policy changes that have more recently oc-
curred in the Gharb. After decades of strong activ-
ity in water and production management, the state 
has started applying a new governance model of 
neoliberal influence. The discussion covers the ap-
propriateness of the new institutional framework to 
support the economy and the communities that have 
been so heavily changed by the Projet Sebou.
 The description of the main changes will reflect 
the points covered earlier in the theoretical review, 
and will particularly refer to the policy reforms re-
ferred to as state disengagement (and decentrali-
zation), modernization and pricing. These aspects 
have been discussed in the field and then support-
ed by data gathered from secondary sources, mainly 
newspapers and reports.
 From the analysis it is evident that despite the in-
creasing need for coordinated governance of such a 
complex region and of the new challenges, the direct 
involvement of the state is decreasing. The econom-
ic crisis that had determined a lack of financial re-
sources was requiring a change from the plan, which 
would not mean state abandonment at this stage. 
Nevertheless, the structural adjustment programmes 
of the World Bank and new trade agreements have 
been asking for a public disengagement in economy 
and service provision. A worldwide trend is chang-
ing the institutional and economic frameworks in 
various countries, leading to decentralization and 
progressive privatization of services, under the in-
fluence of international neoliberal approaches that 
guide aid programmes (Goldman 2007). In practice, 
the state does not retreat completely, but takes on 
new functions of production and control of the new 
legal and institutional assets aiming to facilitate the 
deregulation. The contemporary Moroccan state is 
only selectively neoliberal: while it publicly advo-
cates the reduction of formal regulation, free trade 
and labour market flexibility, it utilizes existing in-
frastructural investment to support certain corpo-
rate interests, unequal landownership and division 
systems.
 This selectivity is also applied within the differ-
ent economic sectors. While the presence of state 
companies in the primary sector is drastically de-
creasing, tourism appears to be the new frontier for 
economic growth, internationalization and country 
modernization (Alami 2004). A good indicator of 
the lower ranking of agriculture production in the 
macro­economic picture is the dismantlement of the 
state rural development companies: SNDE has al-
ready been sold, while SODEA and SOGETA have 
been for sale since 2004 (El Mahjoub 2005). The 
first phase of the liquidation programme has been ac-
complished by handing over 44,000 ha to national, 
but also Spanish and French investors. The second 
phase, involving 38,500 ha, is ongoing, and is con-
firming a return of foreign presence to direct man-
agement of land resources (Najjar 2006; El Farah 
2007). In contrast, as already mentioned, public re­
investment is evident in the tourism sector. The con-
struction of new airports, roads and resorts has been 
finalized to increase the international attractiveness 
of Morocco, and thus, to gather hard currency. One 
example is the activity of the National Investment 
Society, a Moroccan public holding that in 2008 ac-
quired important shares in an investment group of 
Abu Dhabi, SOMED, specialized in tourism resorts, 
with the aim of increasing the hotel sector’s capaci-
ty in Morocco (OBG 2008).
 As for the agricultural sector, the presence of the 
state continues in the form of normative and institu-
tional changes. Decentralization in water manage-
ment has been promoted by the Water Law 10/95 
(BO 1995b). The law established River Basin 
Agencies, including one for the Sebou, which would 
take over some of ORMVAG’s tasks, particular-
ly those related to water monitoring, but not farm-
ing. The new water law embeds the water scarcity 
concerns, and for this, promotes the application of 
new water­saving measures, in line with the wa-
ter demand management principle. Coherently, the 
plan to complete the infrastructural instalment of the 
Sebou only allows the introduction of new irriga-
tion tools, like sprinkler and drip irrigation, and rec-
ommends a substitution of all old gravity canals that 
are still dominant in the Gharb (ABH Sebou 2006). 
Since these tasks will not be carried out by either the 
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ORMVAG or the Basin Agency, the government has 
launched a programme of improvement of large irri-
gation schemes with the aim of guiding a transfer of 
responsibilities from the state to the farmers, in line 
with the international principles of public– private 
participation (El Hammouni, interview 2007).
 Under the programme, farmers who are not al-
ready members of cooperatives, producers’ con-
sortia or large companies have to form new water 
associations (Associations d’usagers de l’eau agri-
cole, AUEAs). AUEAs should, theoretically, deal 
with a number of technical and economic manage-
ment tasks relating to the public schemes. However, 
in reality, although 48 associations have been creat-
ed in the Gharb region, their practical influence in 
the organization and distribution of water is irrel-
evant (Belghiti 2005). The failure is widely recog-
nized and it was also admitted by two ORMVAG 
officers interviewed in 2007. Various reasons ex-
plain the poor effectiveness of the AUEAs: financial 
constraints, as they have not received the public sup-
port from ORMVAG that was originally foreseen; 
lack of capacity, as their constitution was not sup-
ported by adequate training given to the farmers tak-
ing on new functions; and lack of acceptance at the 
grassroots level, as their creation responds to top–
down decisions and is not based on preliminary di-
alogue with the stakeholders. Ranvoisy (2001) also 
mentioned the lack of freedom within the AUEA ad-
ministrations, which should include ORMVAG rep-
resentatives on their boards.
 To stimulate the application of modern irrigation 
tools, a national programme for promotion of local-
ized irrigation was also launched in 2002. It pro-
posed subsidies and technical advice to equip new 
surfaces and reconvert existing irrigation systems 
(El Hasnaoui et al. 2005). The government provided 
incentives covering 30–40 per cent of the installa-
tion costs and the enhancement of regional exten-
sion services (Royaume du Maroc 2006). However, 
their application has been low. On the one hand, 
large farmers have shown minimal interest in this 
programme, as they prefer to continue pumping wa-
ter freely and directly from the river or the ground-
water. On the other hand, most farmers cannot afford 
the remaining costs, particularly in situations of ex-
treme fragmentation of the land tenure. In fact, small 
farmers have the greatest difficulties in accessing 
new irrigation facilities because they are authorized 
to use water from private machines only, provided 
that they use a minimum of 420 hours of irrigation 
per year (Boulassel et al. 2001). Even in this case, 
the creation of AUEAs was supposed to facilitate ac-
cess to water rights by using collective withdrawals. 
But although farmers are formally entitled to occu-
py small landholdings, the reality is a very low ef-
fective occupation. In November 2007, according to 
an ORMVAG officer responsible for the agricultur-
al extension in Souk el Arbaa, only 20 per cent of the 
holdings were effectively occupied. This low and 
scattered presence does not allow the present farm-
ers to work in a group and reach the minimum re-
quirements to be entitled to the new irrigators. The 
weak implementation of this programme indicates 
the difficulties in working with specific technical 
and budget interventions that are not supported by 
coherent policies and in close relation with farmers’ 
needs.
 The other relevant change introduced by the 
government was the new pricing system, justi-
fied as an economic incentive in the water alloca-
tion decision made by producers (Tenneson and 
Rojat 2003). Already proposed by the Agricultural 
Investment Code of 1969, the water tariffs were in-
itially aimed to cover equipment and maintenance 
costs. However, despite the law, ORMVAG kept the 
pricing low to encourage farmers’ participation in 
the large irrigation schemes. From the 1990s, this 
policy has changed, and the previous low tariffs 
are now criticized for having caused waste of water 
and for having impeded substantial fee collection, 
thus making ORMVAG dependent on the state’s, 
decreasing co­financing (Ait Kadi 2002; Frenken 
2005).
 However, the cost recovery problem cannot be 
solved by increasing the water fees. The farmers’ ca-
pacity to pay is very low, and this new policy has 
already widened the group of non­paying users, par-
ticularly in a general situation of decreasing agricul-
tural revenues. Paradoxically, the areas where the 
water­saving systems have been applied are those 
where farmers are facing greater difficulties. The 
application of sprinklers has in fact increased the 
equipment costs, and made the irrigation scheme 
dependent on expensive energy sources to run the 
tools. According to the chief of the network of Souk 
el Arbaa, interviewed on 21 November 2007:
The cost of water for cubic metre is higher where 
sprinklers are used, than in the areas where the 
gravitational systems are still in use: respective-
ly, 0.52 dirham and 0.30 dirham per m3. When 
farmers do not work on their fields, they still 
have to pay the minimum amount of 3000 m3. In 
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these conditions, farmers do not accept the bill-
ing system. ORMVAG officers have reported 
many insolvency cases, with farmers indebted 
for more than 10 years. The collection of fee is a 
critical and conflicting issue, and has brought to 
acts of sabotage on irrigation tools.
Another cause of uncertainty in the farming reve-
nues is the decreased power of the Gharb products 
in the international markets. The Gharb scheme has 
always been particularly focused on cash crops. 
Towards this aim, during the previous phase, 
ORMVAG had allowed farmers to get connected 
to the irrigation network, provided that they devot-
ed the main share of their fields to some crops of 
interest for the scheme. Contracts were then estab-
lished between farmers and local agro­industries, 
for the cultivation of sugarcane, sugar beet and rice. 
The available water was then also used by the farm-
ers to cultivate some other crops, mainly for food. 
ORMVAG also supported the industrial productions 
with subsidies. But once ORMVAG’s role sudden-
ly declined, since the 1990s, subsidized economies 
were not allowed anymore, and local industries had 
difficulties in maintaining their contracts with the 
producers.
 During the current decade, other factors inter-
vened to weaken the agro­industrial economy of the 
Gharb. The entry into force of free trade agreements, 
first among the Arabic Nations (2004) and then be-
tween Morocco and USA (2006), made the national 
production collapse as a result of the more com-
petitive goods produced in the other countries. For 
example, rice produced in the Gharb, which consti-
tutes 95 per cent of the whole national production 
(ABH Sebou 2006), cannot be traded even within 
the country, since the demand can be met by cheap-
er Egyptian rice. As a consequence, the main sug-
ar refineries and rice treatment plants of the Gharb 
are now closed, causing an interruption of the sup-
ply contracts with the farmers, and therefore, the end 
of a secure system of water access for them. Also 
for cereals, water tariffs have made local crops more 
expensive than imported products. This economic 
unsustainable loop has thus caused various dysfunc-
tions in the irrigation system: it has induced increas-
ing abandonment of the fields by farmers, which is 
then reflected in a progressive lack of care and main-
tenance of entire sections of the irrigation network 
(Kharbouchi 2005).
 So far, no solutions are emerging for this prob-
lem. The responses are weak and do not seem 
consistent with the scale of the issue. In line with in-
ternational advice given by UN agencies and bilat-
eral donors, to build consensus among the parties, 
the government has undertaken a National Water 
Dialogue since 2006. This programme is organized 
in focus groups, facilitated by external consultants, 
to discuss a revision of the tariff system, to encour-
age the farmers’ compliance and to get their coopera-
tion. The programme is enforced by foreign support. 
For example, in the rural area of Mnasra, local stake-
holder groups have been activated by the interna-
tional MedWet programme Dialogue on Water in the 
Middle East and North African Region with fund-
ing from German development cooperation agen-
cies. The absence of a government institution in the 
coordination of the meetings is well appreciated by 
the international donors, for they see the presence of 
external consultants as neutral and environmental-
ly friendly in the discussion forum. However, in this 
proposed decision­making process, there are factors 
of ineffective governance for at least three main rea-
sons. First, public institutions, like the rural com-
munes, play a minor role and are positioned at the 
same level as any other stakeholder, in spite of their 
delegation. A second weakness derives from a pro-
cess relying on outsiders acting as experts in water 
saving and pricing, rather than on farmers’ empow-
erment, and as facilitators, despite their poor local 
knowledge, with a clear mission of guiding the de-
bate towards a set of pre­determined goals. Finally, 
the discussion is kept at the local level, which is not 
appropriate when dealing with issues related to the 
nationally wide agricultural and economic decline. 
International aid agencies have a responsibility for 
this, but still continue their programmes in the field, 
so far with poor practical results, while the central 
governmental institutions appear distracted – or per-
haps disillusioned.
Conclusions
This article has discussed the interaction between 
water infrastructure and territorial power in post-
colonial states and particularly in Morocco. It has 
investigated the shift from mega­engineered devel-
opmentalism towards neoliberal policies. It aims 
to complement critical studies on neoliberal envi-
ronments, by focusing in particular on the manip-
ulation, dispossession and commodification of 
water and land resources in irrigated agriculture in 
Morocco. These emerging rationalities are closely 
related to the changing policies of the contemporary 
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Moroccan state that have embraced some well es-
tablished ideas promoted by international donor 
agencies and bilateral donors.
 In particular, the analysis has been grounded 
on the Gharb Plain’s case study. Two distinct eco-
nomic and political phases have been recognized: 
first, the massive public involvement in the national 
economy by instalment of mega­structures, as a way 
to consolidate and modernize the new independent 
state; and a subsequent neoliberal phase, in which 
the state still keeps normative control, but is induced 
to abandon the control of economic sectors to the 
benefit of new international actors. A returning for-
eign presence seems to be producing a new form of 
corporate colonialism in the Gharb.
 This study also brings to light that no serious at-
tention is being paid by policy­makers to the fact 
that these changes involve the destiny of the major-
ity of the local population, who are suffering from 
current institutional abandonment, territorial deseg-
regation and increased poverty. There is continuous 
friction between the rigid, post­Keynesian spatial 
formations created by the postcolonial state through 
the Sebou irrigation project and the local territorial-
ities. This relation has become contradictory to the 
current neoliberal setting of the scheme.
 Projet Sebou has been maintained as a frame-
work for regional development for more than four 
decades, despite its rigidity and the negative impacts 
it has produced. The projet has been very accurate 
in considering the physical and technical features in 
the design of the irrigation scheme, but it has disre-
garded the ethnic, social and the ecosystem values. 
The territorial organization of the local tribes, based 
on the douar centrality, has been obliterated, despite 
deep anthropological research being undertaken by 
Le Coz (1964) at the beginning of the irrigation pro-
ject. The state did not directly target socio­economic 
wealth as the first priority of the plan, since – in line 
with the neo­classical economic principles – this 
would have been driven by macro­economic devel-
opment as a trickle­down effect.
 I have argued that, despite the massive amount 
of resources spent for the infrastructural develop-
ment of the irrigation scheme, poverty remains a 
great issue in the region. In this context, the current 
sale of irrigation supply blocs has made farming in 
the district even more difficult for small landowners. 
At the same time, spatial and environmental chang-
es have produced a detachment between the local 
populations and the Gharb territory. While their 
inclusion as a local labour force in the big project 
had been quite passive, the current crisis has induced 
abandonment of the fields and migration flows to-
wards more dynamic agricultural enterprises out-
side the irrigation scheme, to the urban centres or, 
more recently, to foreign countries.
 Significant change has been witnessed in the 
past two decades, connected to the neoliberal pol-
icies, and expressed by three main factors: first, a 
general economic disengagement of the state from 
the agricultural sector, either as a provider of wa-
ter and other basic services, or as a supporter of 
farmers through subsidies; second, the signature of 
free trade agreements that has left producers in di-
rect competition with stronger international com-
petitors and does not allow the state to intervene to 
help them avoid market failure and all related so-
cial consequences; and third, the introduction of 
water demand management policies, through in-
stitutional and legislative reforms, decentralized 
management and ineffective stakeholder partici-
pation. It is unrealistic for farmers, having execut-
ed ORMVAG’s rules for decades, to suddenly take 
responsibility for the technical management of the 
networks or even make investments to introduce 
new water­saving technologies in their fields. Even 
the decentralized activities of environment monitor-
ing and water quality control appear difficult to ap-
ply. So far, the disempowered ORMVAG is putting 
particular emphasis on the identification of pricing 
methods that could avoid insolvency and the aban-
donment of fields. There is currently a programme 
of focus group meetings in the fields, involving wa-
ter user associations and agricultural producers, 
called by ORMVAG through the intermediation of 
national and international NGOs, in order to build 
a common agreement on tariffs (Chiche, interviews 
in 2007 and 2008). The role of private associations 
in local development issues is becoming more and 
more relevant, but this trend raises issues of demo-
cratic representation since the strongest groupings 
act on the basis of particular, rather than common in-
terests (Mosse 2001).
 There are issues in the Gharb resulting from the 
impacts produced by the national investment pro-
grammes exclusively focused on the cash crop sec-
tor, but the official policies underestimate and do 
not seem to prioritize them. Political decisions seem 
to be completely disconnected from the local situ-
ation. New trade agreements have contributed to 
a further weakening of national production, since 
MEGA­IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES
© The author 2012
Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography
283
importations are more competitive than internal 
production. Environmental concerns seem to have 
received more consideration in recent trade agree-
ments and market choices, while social problems are 
hardly addressed. Productivity remains the target 
and not rural poverty. New agricultural programmes 
of environmental sustainability, including water­
saving practices, are funded by donor agencies, with 
the aim of enlarging the market opportunities of eco-
logical productions. However, only wealthy farm-
ers can benefit from these new projects. Without 
production support and market access, smallhold-
ings cannot sustain a family living and therefore are 
abandoned. Emigration is the alternative to starva-
tion and lack of a sustainable future on the land.
 Water­saving and demand management are em-
braced by policy­makers as solutions to the current 
crisis. However, these solutions are misplaced if 
they do not consider the agricultural, environmental 
and social restructuring that have reshaped the area. 
In light of this, this article has critically scrutinized 
water demand management policies and three cor-
related concepts both theoretically and through the 
Gharb experience: technical modernization, state 
disengagement and water pricing. The challenges in 
applying these soft tools, and their outcomes, have 
been explored.
 More generally, the study has integrated issues 
of water use and agricultural restructuring in coun-
tries subject to developmentalism and neoliberal-
ism. Both approaches have been put under scrutiny 
for their impacts on the ecology, human communi-
ties and livelihoods. Furthermore, neoliberalism as 
a concept has been explored in relation to the main 
principles regulating the local political systems. In 
Morocco, neopatrimonialism protects the wealth of 
selected beneficiaries and only allows limited neo-
liberal policies to permeate the system, including a 
de­regulation and state de­responsibilization from 
non­profitable sectors, empoverished areas and 
communities.
 Finally, the Gharb story has shown another 
case of neoliberal policies protecting the market 
and financial operators but destroying the people. 
Landscape changes, ethnic restructuring and em-
igration of the poor have been the consequences. 
Other stories, both in the so­called developed and 
developing world, have illustrated a similar desti-
ny, showing the pervasive character of the neoliber-
al project and its re­territorializing impacts.
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